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The HAZOP process as part of a PHA has been well established and in LinkedIn groups 
discussions have been on the best supporting software and best practices; the latter, e.g., on 
different opinions whether a checklist and pre-population is desirable. Of course, all are 
apprehensive to missing a significant scenario. On the other hand, required time and effort is 
also a concern. That there is good reason for being concerned about hazard identification 
completeness appears from various studies over the years, e.g., in which in hindsight after an 
incident is analyzed whether the scenario had been predicted. In those studies figures of only 
half of the important scenarios identified are common. Over the years several efforts have been 
published of attempts to semi-automate the process. Intelligent/smart P&ID is a jump forward. 
A recent report on automated HAZOP from a highly experienced engineer who can look back 
on many years of using it, shows good success. More is in the pipeline. Yet, the experience, 
competence, spirit and ingenuity of a HAZOP team in brainstorming sessions remain needed to 
see and weigh the risks, although it can be doubtful that, as some assert, it is the single source. 
The present study comprehends a relatively modest attempt with means that are on every laptop 
to support a HAZOP study, given the availability of an intelligent P&ID. This Data-based semi-
Automatic HAZard IDentification (DAHAZID), seeks to identify possible scenarios with a 
semi-automated system applying both HAZOP and FMECA. The new method will minimize 
the limitations of each method. This will occur by means of a thorough systematic preparation 
before the tools are applied. Rather than depending on reading drawings to obtain connectivity 
information of process system equipment elements, this research is generating and presenting 
in prepopulated work sheets linked components together with all required information and 
space to note HAZID results. Next, this method can be integrated with proper guidelines 
regarding process safer design and hazard analysis. To examine its usefulness, the method has 
been applied to a case study. 
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